The Latest Trump Tariff Case Explained

  Love them or hate them, Trump’s tariffs are in jeopardy following the February 20 Supreme Court decision. Trump had relied on a federal statute called the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to justify his tariffs. The Act states that in the event of a national emergency, the president has the power to “regulate…importation.” 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B). Trump declared a national emergency to address public health concerns regarding an influx of drugs coming into the United States from Canada, Mexico, and China, then began implementing his tariffs through a series of Executive Orders. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24–1287, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Feb, 20, 2025).

     The Supreme Court disagreed that the IEEPA, and specifically the statute’s wording giving the president the power to regulate importation, meant to delegate the authority of implementing tariffs to the executive branch in the case of a national emergency. Learning Resources, slip op. at 14. The Court alludes to three main touchstones, historical precedent, the major questions doctrine, and statutory interpretation, to support the majority opinion that Trump overextends the language of the IEEPA to illegally enact tariffs. Id. at 5-15.

     First, the Court explains that no past president has ever attempted to use the IEEPA to enact tariffs before Trump. Tariffs implemented by Trump (at one point as high as 145% on Chinese goods) have “great economic and political significance.” Id. at 11. To understand whether a president is allowed to engage in this novel application of the IEEPA, the Court must consider whether the president acted within constitutional bounds, and whether Congress intended to authorize the president to impose the great power of tariffs through the IEEPA.

     The power of taxation is expressly reserved for Congress, which acts as the Purse of the United States. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Taxation is perhaps the most important role of the federal government, beginning from the American Revolution that came about through the angst of taxation without representation. Representation occurs most directly through the legislative branch, where a bicameral approach accounts for proportionate population and state interests. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2-3. In the Framers' view, as alluded to by the majority opinion, Congress has the power to tax because it best represents the diverse factions that make up the American people. Federalist No. 10. Since the Court classifies tariffs as a tax, with the same purpose of raising revenue for the government, tariffs are a reserved power of the legislative branch unless delegated through express authority to the president. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Because the Trump administration does not have the power to impose tariffs on its own, the administration had to manufacture permission from Congress, settling on the vague language in the IEEPA to grant a green light forward. 

     The enumerated powers of the federal government’s three branches can have blurry edges, where in some cases, the branches can pawn off their authorities to each other through consent. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). However, according to the major questions doctrine, ambiguous statutory language is not enough to grant authority from Congress to the president. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721–23 (2022). In the case at hand, the term “regulate” is not explicit enough to allow a president to impose tariffs, so Trump has no clear Congressional permission to enact tariffs, even under the circumstance of a declared national emergency. Learning Resources, slip op. at 14.

     Statutory interpretation furthermore aids the Court in understanding the true meaning of the IEEPA. On this point, the concurring Justices diverge to express perspectives on how to best interpret statutes. Learning Resources, slip op. at 14-88. Textualism is one approach, where dictionary definitions of “regulate” are explained to exclude enacting tariffs. Legislative history, of which little to no evidence exists to support Trump’s interpretation of the law, is also examined. The court additionally turns to canons of construction, which guide an examination of how Congress could have specified if meaning to allow executive enactment of tariffs in a national emergency. All roads of the statutory interpretation lead to the same destination, that the IEEPA cannot be read to allow Trump to impose tariffs. Id. at 14-88.

     So, what happens now? In my view, Trump will likely not accept defeat, and he has already  vowed to continue his tariff regime. Trump may attempt to find a clearer (or even just different) congressional statute that could be interpreted to give him the ability to impose tariffs. The battle between Trump and the Supreme Court will in this instance continue, where the Justices would be forced to either reexamine the issue or throw up their hands. If Congress takes the temperature of the public (and, too, the perhaps more persuasive reaction of lobbyists) to find that the country generally supports Trump’s tariffs, Congress can more clearly delegate its authority to Trump as allowed by the major questions doctrine, thus clarifying the “zone of twilight” in which the distribution of power between Congress and the president was before uncertain. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). No matter the path forward, the Constitution limits Trump’s authority to the extent that it underscores the laws written by Congress and guides the decisions of the Supreme Court, and he must act within the bounds of the law.